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The “Any Evidence” Rule in New Zealand Family Law 
 
ANNA HIGH AND CAROLINE HICKMAN1 
 
The “any evidence” rule provides judicial discretion to admit evidence in the Family Court 
which would otherwise be inadmissible. Although the rule has frequently been criticised, 
its operation and ongoing value have not been closely examined. In its recently-reformed 
iteration, the “any evidence” rule embodies and demands a rigorous approach to 
evidentiary issues in the Family Court, premised on fundamental Evidence Act principles 
of relevance, probative value and prejudicial effect. In this first comprehensive review of 
the New Zealand family law “any evidence” rule, based on an analysis of post-reform case 
law, we argue that the rule should be repealed. It is unnecessary, other than in relation to 
the special issue of children’s hearsay, and in practice contributes to a lax approach to the 
admission of evidence in the Family Court. We conclude by setting out recommendations 
for reformed law and practice, and directing users towards a more principled approach to 
family law evidence in the meantime. 
 




Evidence admissibility rules determine what information can be relied on in legal fact-finding 
proceedings. In New Zealand, the Evidence Act 2006 sets out admissibility rules aimed at ensuring 
that “relevant and useful material” is available to the court, and that irrelevant material, obvious 
prejudices, and unsafe assumptions are avoided.3 
 
In the family jurisdiction, the approach to admissibility has historically been relaxed. Family law 
statutes have for many years contained some version of an “any evidence” rule,4 allowing the court 
to depart from strict admissibility principles and accept any evidence that it thinks fit, regardless 
of whether it would otherwise be admissible in a court of law.5 These provisions were substituted 
 
1 This paper is based in part on research presented in Caroline Hickman’s LLM dissertation, “‘Any evidence’ in the 
Family Court” (Victoria University of Wellington, 2017), and in our published conference paper, Caroline Hickman 
and Anna High “Anarchy and analysis—applying the rules to child-related evidence” (paper presented to New Zealand 
Law Society Family Law Conference, Wellington, November 2019). With thanks to Elisabeth McDonald and Bill 
Atkin for their encouragement, insight and guidance as co-supervisors of Caroline’s LLM dissertation. Our thanks go 
to Simon Jefferson QC, Bill Atkin, Julia Tolmie and two anonymous peer reviewers for providing helpful comments 
on an earlier draft, and to Candy Yoo, Kayla Deadman and Craig Tatley for assistance with our research. Any mistakes 
are ours alone. 
2 Charles Dickens, Great Expectations.  
3 Law Commission Evidence Law: Principles for Reform (NZLC PP13, 1991) at [38]. 
4 We use the term “‘any evidence’ rule” throughout, as it is commonly known, but note here that the term is somewhat 
confusing, as the “rule” is one that confers a judicial discretion, albeit one that is fettered. For that reason, we also use 
the term “‘any evidence’ discretion” when describing the power conferred by the rule.      
5 The rule is peculiar to the Family Court, although it appears in similar form in other statutes: Substance Addiction 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 2017, s 80; Resource Management Act 1991, ss 276, 277A; Coroners 
Act 2006, s 79; Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993, s 69; Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 
1992, s 22; and Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003, s 127. 
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in 2014 by s 12A(4) of the Family Court Act 1980, which both asserts the primacy of the Evidence 
Act 2006 and sets out a qualified “any evidence” rule.  
 
The “any evidence” approach is a longstanding feature of family law proceedings, the utility of 
which is rarely questioned. A flexible “any evidence” approach is premised on the “free proof” 
doctrine, which advocates that fact-finders should be free from legal constraints in evaluating 
evidence and determining facts. 6  This doctrine presupposes that the greater the amount of 
information available to a court, the more accurate its decisions. 7  However, if applied in an 
unprincipled way, “free proof” can result in a lack of evidential rigour, which in turn risks breeding 
further conflict, obfuscating key issues and prolonging court proceedings. These risks must be 
weighed against the purported benefits of the “any evidence” rule. 
 
This article considers the application and utility of the Family Court “any evidence” rule in New 
Zealand. The New Zealand Family Court has long interpreted the “any evidence” discretion as 
inherently constrained by the interests of justice, rejecting the “free proof” premise that 
admissibility rules are a hindrance to accurate fact-finding. This rejection of “free proof” is evident 
in the newly formulated s 12A(4), with its prioritisation of the Evidence Act 2006, However, the 
“any evidence” discretion has been retained, albeit in a modified form, causing ongoing confusion 
and complacency when it comes to the application of evidentiary rules and principles in the Family 
Court. We argue the rule should be repealed, and we direct users towards a more principled 
approach to family law evidence in the meantime. 
 
At the outset, we acknowledge that the issue of evidentiary rules in the family law jurisdiction 
relates to an ongoing debate about adversarialism and formality in the resolution of family law 
disputes.8 This article recognises and at times speaks to that broader debate, but our focus is on the 
current state of the law relating to admissibility of evidence in the Family Court in New Zealand. 
It is important to note, here, that the New Zealand Family Court, although created with the 
intention of departing from a strictly adversarial model,9 does not operate as a truly inquisitorial 
or investigative court so as to justify consideration of evidence which does not meet acceptable 
legal standards.10 
 
6 Alex Stein Foundations of Evidence Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) at 108–110. 
7 Stein, above n 6, at 123. 
8 See, e.g., Penelope Welbourne “Adversarial Courts, Therapeutic Justice and Protecting Children in the Family 
Justice System” (2016) 28 Child & Fam LQ 205; Jennifer E McIntosh, Hon. Diana Bryant and Kristen Murray 
“Evidence of a Different Nature: The Child-Responsive and Less Adversarial Initiatives of the Family Court of 
Australia” (2008) 46(1) Family Court Review 125; Rosemary Hunter “Adversarial Mythologies: Policy Assumptions 
and Research Evidence in Family Law” (2003) 30(1) J of Law & Soc 156; and Jane Murphy “Revitalizing the 
Adversary System in Family Law” (2010) 78(3) University of Cincinnati L Rev 891. In the New Zealand context, 
debates about adversarialism in family law must also consider the need to embrace te ao Māori and kaupapa Māori, 
which may ultimately have implications for the way evidence is introduced into the Family Court: see Te Korowai 
Ture ā Whānau: the final report of the Independent Panel examining the 2014 family justice reforms (Ministry of 
Justice, Wellington, May 2019). The Korowai report is beyond the scope of this paper, although we note that the report 
did express concern about the state of evidence in the current family justice system (at [326]). 
9 David Beattie Royal Commission on the Courts (Wellington, NZ Government, 1978). Notably, since 2014, pre-Court 
mediation is mandatory for all care of children cases commenced on notice in New Zealand – this process provides a 
therapeutic, family-directed, non-adversarial process within the family justice system.  
10 The Family Court can be distinguished, in this respect, from the other specialist courts which also adopt variations 
of the “any evidence” rule: the Environment Court, the Coroners Court, and the Māori Land Court. These Courts 
engage in wide-ranging, court-directed inquiries of an investigative nature. 
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This article proceeds as follows. Part II outlines the legislative history of family law “any evidence” 
rules in New Zealand, and problems identified with evidence in Family Court proceedings prior to 
the 2014 reforms. Part III reviews the reformed approach set out in s 12A(4), which expressly 
provides for the application of the Evidence Act 2006 to Family Court proceedings. Section 12A(4) 
also puts a new gloss on the “any evidence” rule—that any evidence admitted by that route be of 
assistance to the Court. We argue that this gloss mandates consideration of the fundamental 
principles set out in ss 7 and 8 of the Evidence Act—relevance, probative value and potential 
prejudicial effect—before the “any evidence” discretion can be exercised. 
 
In Part IV, we set out an analysis of post-reform cases engaging with the s 12A(4) discretion. This 
sets the scene for a discussion, in Part V, of the costs and benefits of “any evidence” as applied in 
practice: what liberties have been taken with the “any evidence” rule and at what cost? We argue 
that these costs do not justify the purported benefits of “any evidence”, given that our case analysis 
suggests the application of Evidence Act principles and rules would not generally result in the 
exclusion of relevant evidence. An exception to this argument is in relation to children’s hearsay, 
an issue that requires special treatment given the need to protect children from giving evidence in 
family disputes. In Part VI, we set out the case for (i) repeal of the rule and (ii) reformed practice, 
including the need for practitioners to approach evidentiary questions in a more principled way. 
Rigour and scrutiny, premised on fundamental Evidence Act principles, are always required 
around questions of admissibility. As one judge has commented, “relaxation of the rules of 
evidence is not a licence for evidential anarchy”.11 To achieve the appropriate level of evidential 
rigour in the special context of the Family Court, the “any evidence” rule should be repealed. 
 
II “Any Evidence it Thinks Fit”: the Historic Approach to Evidence in New Zealand Family 
Law 
 
A Pre-Reform Family Law “Any Evidence” Rules 
 
New Zealand originally adopted the “any evidence” rule in the package of Imperial Statutes 
imported as law during the 19th century, with a version of the rule included in the Destitute Persons 
Act 1894.12  The rule was subsequently adopted by the Domestic Proceedings Act 1968,13 the 
Family Proceedings Act 1980,14 and then by other family law statutes.15 
 
 
11 D v O [2006] NZFLR 137 (FC) at [22] per Judge Murfitt. 
12 Section 42: “In proceedings under this Act, the Magistrate may receive any evidence as to him may seem fit, whether 
the same be strictly legal evidence or not.” 
13 Section 114: “In all proceedings under this Act (other than criminal proceedings), and whether by way of hearing 
in the first instance or by way of appeal, or otherwise howsoever, the Court may receive any evidence that it thinks 
fit, whether it is otherwise admissible in a Court of law or not.” 
14 Section 164: “In any proceedings under this Act (other than criminal proceedings or proceedings under section 130 
of this Act), and whether by way of hearing in the first instance or by way of appeal, or otherwise, the Court may 
receive any evidence that it thinks fit, whether it is otherwise admissible in a Court of law or not.” 
15 Adoption Act 1955 s 24; Care of Children Act 2004 s 128; Child Support Act 1991 s 228; Children, Young Persons, 
and Their Families Act 1989 s 195; Domestic Violence Act 1995 s 84; Family Proceedings Act 1980 s 164; Intellectual 
Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003 s 127; Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992 s 22; Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 36; and Protection of Personal and Property Rights 
Act 1988 s 77. 
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By way of example, a typical “any evidence” rule was found in s 128 of the Care of Children Act 
2004, which provided:16 
In all proceedings under this Act (other than criminal proceedings, but including appeals 
or any other proceedings), the court may receive any evidence that it thinks fit, whether 
or not it is otherwise admissible in a court of law. 
 
B The Limits of “Any Evidence”: Analysis, Not Anarchy 
 
On its face, an “any evidence” discretion embodies the “free proof” premise of “information 
produces accuracy”. However, as Stein notes, while this premise is instinctively appealing, 
supplementing incomplete information with information of “uncertain credentials” may in fact 
increase the risk of fact-finding error due to issues of credibility.17 Most importantly, the admission 
of evidence that is irrelevant or insufficiently probative as weighed against prejudicial effect or 
delay can only distract, mislead or needlessly prolong proceedings. 
 
Accordingly, although the discretion conferred by “any evidence” rules to admit otherwise 
inadmissible evidence appears unfettered, this is not so. Even pre-reform, the rules had been 
interpreted by the courts as being inherently constrained by the interests of justice.18 As such, 
admissibility decisions mandated analysis, rather than total anarchy, when it came to evidence law 
principles. 
 
In Barlow v Barlow, Judge Inglis QC laid out the appropriate approach:19 
The interests of justice obviously cannot be served by a view that [“any evidence” rules 
confer] absolute license [sic] to ignore established rules of evidence … The discretion 
must take into account the reasons of policy why certain evidence … is ordinarily 
inadmissible. … In general terms the interests of justice in exercising the [“any evidence” 
discretion] will therefore best be furthered by bearing in mind the three basic and 
underlying principles by which the admissibility of most evidence is tested: is the 
evidence sought to be adduced relevant? Is it reliable? Is it a matter of necessity that 
evidence of a particular nature be admitted—necessary in the sense that evidence of the 
facts sought to be proved cannot be adduced in any other way?  
Similarly, in BSH v Ministry of Social Development, Dobson J considered the interrelationship of 
Evidence Act principles and one such “any evidence” rule, holding that the latter did not provide 
the Family Court with:20 
licence to disregard the rules of evidence. Instead, it is indicative of the emphasis in 
such proceedings that an overly technical approach should not frustrate the purposes of 
the [applicable family law Act]. The tenets of the Evidence Act—relevance and 
reliability—are still fundamentals in [Family Court proceedings].  
 
16 Repealed by the Family Courts Amendment Act 2013, s 9. 
17 Stein, above n 6, at 123–132. 
18 Radisich v Taylor HC Auckland CIV-2007-404-3276, 23 March 2009. 
19 Barlow v Barlow FC Christchurch FP009/473/96, 16 September 1998. 
20 BSH v Ministry of Social Development HC Wellington CIV-2009-485-403, 13 August 2009 at [93]. 
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In other words, the applicable “any evidence” rule was to be exercised in a principled way, with 
due regard given to the fundamental tenets of relevance and reliability. 21  “Any evidence” 
provisions provide the Family Court with a discretion, but not a “discretion to degrade justice by 
cutting corners”.22 This approach was approved by Panckhurst J in BAB v Ministry of Social 
Development, who noted that while the Family Court has a “wide discretion to hear evidence which 
is not ordinarily admissible … it should not do so at the expense of the rule of law or on an 
unprincipled basis”.23  
 
Writing in New Zealand Family Law in the 21st Century, former Family Court Judge Inglis QC 
described the (pre-reform) position as follows:24 
The Court's [“any evidence”] discretion … is not a power to treat the ordinary rules of 
evidence as if they did not exist. … The statutory availability of the discretion has to be 
seen against the background of the basic principle that the ordinary rules of evidence 
are a necessary party of the machinery of justice, whatever feelings of impatience there 
may sometimes be about their complexity or apparent oddity. 
In sum, even prior to the 2014 reforms, the Family Court and High Court had repeatedly espoused 
the need for admissibility to be grounded in the fundamental principles of relevance and reliability, 
with a view to ensuring that “any evidence” provisions were not taken as license to disregard the 
interests of natural justice. 25  Rigour and scrutiny were still required around questions of 
admissibility, premised on fundamental Evidence Act principles. 
 
C Quality of Evidence in the Family Court 
 
Despite the implied “natural justice” fetter on the “any evidence” discretion, practitioners 
frequently prepared pleadings and affidavits without turning their minds to basic principles of 
admissibility or applying any evidential rigour, adopting an ‘“anything goes” in an “any evidence” 
hearing’ approach.26 Affidavits routinely contained irrelevant or unreliable material. Hearsay, 
 
21 BSH v Ministry of Social Development, above n 20, at [28]; see also Re L (Care and Protection) (2001) NZFLR 681 
(FC) at [28]; Re the S Children FC New Plymouth CYPF04301399, 24 April 2002 at [50]; and FSE v SJH FC 
Christchurch FAM-1000-009-1560/1561, 2 September 2011 at [26]. 
22 Re the S Children FC New Plymouth CYPF04301399, 24 April 2002 at [53] per Judge Inglis QC.  
23 BAB v Ministry of Social Development HC Invercargill CIV-2010-425-583, 30 November 2010 at [28]. 
24 B D Inglis New Zealand Family Law in the 21st Century (Thomson Brookers, Wellington, 2007) at [9.2]. 
25 FSE v SJH FC Christchurch FAM-1000-009-1560/1561, 2 September 2011 at [26], citing Taylor-Edwards v 
Palmer [2002] NZFLR 812 (FC); Barlow v Barlow, above n 19; Nicholls v Nicholls [1996] NZFLR 311 (FC); 
Coleman v Coleman DC Auckland FP515/91, 6 August 1997; Kepa v Hautapu (1998) 17 FRNZ 100 (FC); and M v 
W FC Auckland, 8 November 1998. 
26 In T v G [2007] NZFLR 121 (FC), Judge Riddell noted various High Court decisions concerning Family Court 
affidavits that did not comply with the laws of evidence: Walker v Walker [2006] NZFLR 768 (HC); A v A HC 
Hamilton CIV-2005-419-928, 29 March 2006; R v B HC Auckland CIV-2006-404-1666, 12 May 2006; Burgner v 
Nelis HC Auckland CIV-2004-404-149, 12 December 2005; and Roulston v Roulston HC Auckland CIV-2004-404-
7120, 12 December 2005. See also Simon Jefferson QC “A review of the Family Court 2011: Sorry, Snow White 
can’t afford dwarves this year” (paper presented to Parliament in 2011 at the Symposium on Family Law, Wellington 
2011) at 42:  
For some reason it has become accepted practice with affidavits … incorporating a gallimaufry of 
fact, opinion, submission, surmise and (often) spite. The so-called “any evidence” rule becomes the 
cloak beneath which these calumnies are concealed. To enforce the rules litigants are obliged to 
incur costs and delay. 
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opinion, argument, repetition, inflammatory or self-serving comment, or privileged/confidential 
information were often included, but without any justification as to why the ordinary rules of 
evidence ought not to apply. Liberties were taken to the extent that one judge remarked that 
“relaxation of the rules of evidence is not a licence for evidential anarchy”.27 
 
In response to these concerns, in 2011 the Ministry of Justice canvassed proposals to change the 
“any evidence” approach to family proceedings, noting that “the standard of evidence filed in the 
[Family] Court is often poor”.28 The Ministry also criticised the “any evidence” rule as being “the 
norm rather than the exception to the stricter requirements of the Evidence Act 2006”.29   
 
In a letter to the author, the Ministry expanded, explaining that it had received criticism from:30  
… judges, lawyers and family law academics about the any evidence rule … [T]he 
Ministry was informed that affidavits were being filed that had little regard to the rules 
of evidence or without providing any justification for why the Court should make an 
exception to those rules.  
III Any Evidence of Assistance: Section 12A(4) Family Court Act 1980 
 
In the wide-ranging family law amendments that came into force in 2014, a new formulation of 
the “any evidence” rule was enacted in s 12A(4) of the Family Court Act 1980: 
(4) The effect of section 5(3) of the Evidence Act 2006 is that that Act applies to the 
proceeding. However, the court hearing the proceeding may receive any evidence, 
whether or not admissible under the Evidence Act 2006, that the court considers 
may assist it to determine the proceeding. 
The amending Act removed the “any evidence” rule from various family law statutes in which it 
appeared31 and made s 12A universally applicable across the listed family law statutes.32  
 




27 D v O, above n 11, at [22]. 
28 Ministry of Justice Reviewing the Family Court: A public consultation paper (20 September 2011) at 48. 
29 At 48. 
30 Letter received by Caroline Hickman from the Ministry of Justice dated 12 February 2016 regarding relevant 
information around the reform of the “any evidence” rule (obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to 
the Ministry of Justice February 2016).  
31 Family Courts Amendment Act 2013 s 9, inserting new section 17A to the Family Court Act 1980. 
32 Family Courts Amendment Act 2013, s 5, inserting new section 12A to the Family Court Act 1980. The Mental 
Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 and the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and 
Rehabilitation) Act 2003 are notably excluded from this list, and have retained their stand-alone “any evidence” 
provisions (s 22 and s 127, respectively). Both Acts deal with persons subject to mental incapacity and the hearings 
(at least for mental health) are informal and usually not held in the Family Court. However, it should be noted that the 
Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 also deals with incapacitated persons, but is included in the s 12A 
list. It is unclear what justifies different rules of evidence for these proceedings. The Family Protection Act 1955 is 
also excluded from the list and retains the “any evidence” discretion in s 11 that deals with evidence of the deceased’s 
reasons for dispositions. 
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Section 12A(4) first provides expressly for the application of the Evidence Act 2006 to Family 
Court proceedings, before going on to set out a new, qualified “any evidence” rule. The former is 
prima facie difficult to reconcile with the latter. However, pre-reform case law sheds light on the 
interrelationship of “any evidence” rules with the Evidence Act 2006.  
 
Following the enactment of that Act, a new codified set of evidential rules became available to 
Family Court proceedings. Although the Evidence Act expressly applies to Family Court 
proceedings, 33  it was also designated as subordinate to any other enactments in cases of 
inconsistency, including the various “any evidence” rules that were scattered throughout various 
family law statutes.34 This resulted in a debate as to which prevailed in terms of precedence—“any 
evidence” provisions or the Evidence Act.35 
 
In BAB v Ministry of Social Development, Panckhurst J argued that the correct starting point for 
an admissibility analysis would be the broad-ranging discretion conferred by the “any evidence” 
rule, rather than the Evidence Act 2006, albeit on a principled basis with reference to the 
fundamental tenets of the Act.36 This approach was also favoured by Judge E Smith in FSE v 
SJH.37  
 
However, a sea change in approach to the interrelationship of the “any evidence” rule with the 
Evidence Act was heralded by Judge Moss in O v S, in which the application of Evidence Act rules 
was used as the primary basis for admission of evidence in the Family Court.38 This approach was 
taken up by Judge Coyle in PCH v AMK, who held that, given that it codifies the law of evidence, 
the Evidence Act “should now be used as a touchstone by which the standard of evidence should 
be measured in the Family Court”.39 As such, the “any evidence” discretion should be a secondary 
consideration, to be exercised after first asking whether evidence is admissible under the Evidence 
Act.40 
 
This prioritisation of the Evidence Act has now been clearly mandated in s 12A(4) of the Family 
Courts Act 1980, in that the section prefaces the new “any evidence” rule with express reference 
to the applicability of the Evidence Act 2006 to Family Court proceedings. 
 
B New Gloss on the “Any Evidence” Rule 
 
The s 12A(4) “any evidence” provision echoes the permissive language of repealed versions of the 
rule in enabling the court to receive “any evidence, whether or not [otherwise admissible]”. 
 
33 Evidence Act 2006, s 5(3): “This Act applies to all proceedings …”; s 4: “proceeding means (a) a proceeding 
conducted by a court; …”; “court includes the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court, and the District 
Court”; “District Court includes (a) the Family Court …”. 
34 Evidence Act 2006, s 5(1): providing that where there is an inconsistency between the Evidence Act and any other 
enactment, the other enactment prevails unless the Evidence Act provides otherwise. 
35 FSH v SJH FC Christchurch FAM-1999-009-1560, 2 September 2011 at [22]. 
36 BAB v Ministry of Social Development HC Invercargill CIV-2010-425-583, 30 November 2010 at [28]. 
37 FSH v SJH FC Christchurch FAM-1999-009-1560, 2 September 2011 at [29]. 
38 O v S FC Lower Hutt FAM-2008-032-132, 7 April 2008. 
39 PCH v AMK FC Dunedin FAM-2006-005-4, 27 May 2011 at [20]. 
40 PCH v AMK, above n 39, at [22]. Judge Coyle found support for this approach in the decision of Judge Burns in 
Taylor v Radisich [2010] NZFLR 712 (FC) at [24]. For a pre-Evidence Act “evidence law first” approach, see Taylor-
Edwards v Palmer [2002] NZFLR 812 (FC) at [17] per Judge Mill. 
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However, s 12A(4) adds an important gloss to the rule: the evidence in question must be evidence 
“that the court considers may assist it to determine the proceeding”. As noted by Judge Coyle, this 
is a significant change and renders the discretion to admit “any evidence” less permissive—it 
introduces a “gateway” that must be satisfied (that the evidence may be “of assistance in 
determining the proceedings”) before the Court can decide to admit otherwise inadmissible 
evidence.41 
 
The High Court in M v Ministry of Social Development found that this “may assist” threshold is 
low and probably “not much higher than mere relevance”—the test set out in s 7 of the Evidence 
Act.42 We submit that both pre-reform case law, and principle, suggest the threshold is properly 
read as higher, equating to the tests in both sections 7(2) and 8 of the Evidence Act. In other words, 
the proviso “may assist” should be read as effectively fettering the “any evidence” discretion with 
the rules set out in sections 7(2) and 8 of the Act, which require exclusion of irrelevant evidence, 
and evidence where probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or needlessly 
prolonging the proceedings, respectively. As discussed above, even prior to the added gloss, “any 
evidence” rules were read as limited by the interests of justice and rule of law.43 This admissibility 
analysis required, at a minimum, consideration of the foundational tenets of relevance and 
reliability, as reliance on irrelevant or unreliable evidence was obviously counter to the interests 
of justice.44  The position is clearer with the added proviso. Before admitting evidence under the 
“any evidence” discretion, the Judge must be satisfied that it may be of assistance. Far from being 
of assistance, evidence which is irrelevant, or insufficiently probative as weighed against undue 
prejudice or prolonging of the proceedings, can only mislead, distract, cause prejudice, increase 
fact-finding errors or add to costs.  
 
In sum, properly applied, the “any evidence” discretion cannot be used to admit evidence that 
would be inadmissible under the foundational exclusionary rules set out in s 7(2) and s 8 of the 
Evidence Act.  Further, departure from other exclusionary rules—such as the rule against hearsay 
or opinion—requires principled consideration of the underlying policy concerns addressed by 
those rules, and whether reliance on the “any evidence” discretion to circumvent the Act comports 
with the interests of natural justice.  
 
IV Case Analysis 
 
As noted above, in 2011 the Ministry of Justice expressed concern that the “any evidence” rule 
was operating as the norm for admissibility decisions, rather than the exception.45 In order to assess 
the operation of the reformed “any evidence” rule in practice, in this section we set out an analysis 
of case law dealing with s 12A(4) of the Family Court Act.  
 
 
41 Magan v Magan [2014] NZFC 8181 at [4]. 
42 M v Ministry of Social Development [2014] NZHC 3398 at [51]. 
43 Above at II.B. 
44 We note that pre-reform case law on “any evidence” frequently referred to relevance and reliability as foundational 
tenets of admissibility. More recently, the Court of Appeal has clarified that reliability is generally a question for the 
fact-finder, rather than an admissibility consideration, other than in extraordinary circumstances. As such, the s 8 
analysis properly centres on probative value, not reliability. See Anna High “The Red Fox Tavern trial and the 
Evidence Act” [2020] NZLJ 69. 
45 Ministry of Justice, above n 28, at 48. 
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Before reviewing the case law, we note that our analysis is limited to judgments expressly 
addressing the s 12A(4) discretion. A comprehensive review of Family Court affidavits filed and 
oral hearing transcripts for all instances of admission of evidence via the s 12A(4) discretion is 
beyond the scope of this article. However, it is still possible to gain initial insights on the role of 
s 12A(4) in practice by reviewing instances where the provision was debated and addressed in the 
judgments. 
 
A search of Westlaw and LexisAdvance resulted in a sample of 30 cases from 2014–2019 inclusive 
referring to s 12A(4). Six of these cases contained only passing reference to the provision, and 
were excluded from the analysis.46 
 
Of the remaining 24 (one Court of Appeal, 10 High Court, 13 Family Court), in 13 cases, the court 
relied on the Evidence Act 2006 for admissibility analysis and declined to exercise the s 12A(4) 
discretion. These cases generally aligned with the pre-reform jurisprudence on the “any evidence” 
rule, discussed above, emphasising that the Evidence Act 2006 should be the primary basis for 
admission of evidence in the Family Court, despite the discretion afforded by “any evidence” rules.  
 
In 11 cases, the court did exercise the s 12A(4) discretion. These cases concerned hearsay evidence 
(four cases),47 opinion evidence (three),48 privileged information (two)49 and other inadmissible 
evidence (two).50 However, our analysis shows that in all cases, it was either (i) not necessary to 
exercise the discretion; (ii) not appropriate to exercise the discretion; or (iii) the Evidence Act has 




As a preliminary point, we note that there is some statutory ambiguity as to the application of the 
Evidence Act hearsay rules in the Family Court. Under the Evidence Act, hearsay evidence is 
excluded by s 17, but can be admitted under s 18 (general admissibility of hearsay), s 19 (hearsay 
in business records) or s 20 (admissibility in civil proceedings). Section 20 provides that hearsay 
statements contained in an affidavit are admissible in civil cases, if and to the extent that the 
applicable rules of court permit such statements. It could be argued that the “any evidence” 
provision in s 12A(4) is an “applicable rule of court” that operates to allow hearsay statements 
contained in Family Court affidavits. However, s 12A(4) also provides that the Evidence Act 2006 
applies in the Family Court, and as discussed above this is properly interpreted, and has generally 
 
46 Lowe v Auckland Family Court [2017] NZHC 758; Halle v Drinkwater [2015] NZFC 6783; NS v TD Legal 
Complaints Review Officer LCRO151/2016, 27 September 2018, Maidment RO; French v Black [2015] NZHC 2519; 
Lyttelton Port Company Ltd v Pender [2019] NZEmpC 86; and Armstrong v O’Neill [2015] NZFC 5670, [2016] 
NZFLR 77. 
47 H v W [2019] NZHC 616, [2018] NZFLR 1015; SG v DSG [2019] NZHC 2579; L v R [2017] NZHC 590, [2017] 
NZFLR 177; Malcolm v Lloyd [2015] NZHC 1483. 
48 M v Ministry of Social Development [2014] NZHC 3398; Gibbs v Watt [2015] NZFC 5715; Bethell v Bethell [2018] 
NZHC 3171. 
49 Goodwin v Rensford [2015] NZFC 2156; Arrington v Slater [2016] NZFC 5176. 
50 Gebrien v Todd [2015] NZFC 4949; OG v JK [2016] NZFC 9831. 
51 The full case summaries and analyses are set out in Caroline Hickman and Anna High, “Family Court Act s12A(4) 




been taken by the courts, to mean that the Evidence Act should ordinarily apply, unless there is 
principled reason for departure. As such, we argue that the inclusion of hearsay in Family Court 
affidavits is properly governed by the two-pronged general hearsay admissibility test in s 18, not 
by s 20. 
 
It could similarly be argued that r 169 of the Family Court Rules 2002, which allows for the court 
to grant leave to use a deponent’s affidavit as evidence despite the deponent not appearing for 
cross-examination, activates s 20 of the Evidence Act. In such circumstances, the affidavit is itself 
hearsay (to the extent its contents are relied on as truth), as it is a statement made by a person who 
is not a witness.52 If r 169 is an “applicable rule of court” that “permit[s] a statement of that kind 
[hearsay] to be made in the affidavit”, then the affidavit will be admissible under s 20 of the 
Evidence Act, without needing to satisfy the reliability and necessity tests in s 18. We do not find 
this argument convincing, as s 20 seems intended by its wording to be referring to hearsay 
statements contained in affidavits, not affidavits that are hearsay in their entirety. As such, we 
submit that the admission of an affidavit where the deponent is unavailable for cross-examination 
is properly governed by the s 18 Evidence Act test.53 
 
Moving to the case analysis, in three of the four cases concerning hearsay, the court relied on 
s 12A(4) to admit evidence that would likely have passed an Evidence Act s 18 analysis (i.e. 
recourse to s 12A(4) was unnecessary).54 That section allows for the admission of hearsay evidence 
where the circumstances relating to the statement provide reasonable assurance of reliability, and 
either the statement maker is unavailable as a witness or requiring them to be a witness would 
cause undue expense or delay. Section 18 was enacted to ensure that the rule against hearsay 
operates to exclude evidence only if there are sound policy reasons for so doing.55 In the Family 
Court, the scope for admission under s 18 will generally be broad as compared to criminal 
proceedings, given the focus can generally be on the proceedings as a whole (including the best 
interests of children, in child-related cases) rather than the fair trial and natural justice rights of a 
criminal defendant. In the criminal context, the right to confront one’s accuser and test their 
evidence through cross-examination means that the scope for admitting hearsay to avoid “undue 
expense or delay” will generally be more limited. 
 
So, for example, in SG v DSG,56 Fitzgerald J relied on s 12A(4) to admit affidavits sworn by a 
deponent who refused to appear in New Zealand proceedings relating to an international custody 
dispute, despite the deponent not being available for cross-examination. Her Honour did not first 
 
52 Evidence Act 2006, s 4 definition of witness: a person who gives evidence and is able to be cross-examined. 
53 This was the approach taken in Gao v Jiang [2015] NZFC 6255, [2016] NZFLR 315. In that case, the Court found 
the evidence not to be admissible under s 18, as the deponent was not “unavailable” for the purposes of s 18. The 
Court declined to admit the evidence under the s 12A(4) discretion, as it was not pivotal. See also Llamas v Massaar 
[2017] NZHC 357, [2018] NZFLR 341. After finding the affidavit in question (stating that the deponent not available 
for cross-examination) was inadmissible under the Evidence Act (as the deponent not “unavailable” for purposes of s 
18), the Court declined to exercise the s 12A(4) discretion because it had not been asked to grant leave under r 169. 
But see SG v DSG [2019] NZHC 2579 (below n 56), where the Court relied on s 12A(4) to admit affidavits sworn by 
an deponent who did not appear for cross-examination, without engaging first in a s 18 analysis. 
54 H v W [2019] NZHC 616, [2018] NZFLR 1015; SG v DSG [2019] NZHC 2579; Malcolm v Lloyd [2015] NZHC 
1483. 
55 Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55, 1999) at [45], cited in Elisabeth McDonald Principles 
of Evidence in Criminal Cases (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at 139. 
56 SG v DSG [2019] NZHC 2579. 
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engage in a s 18 analysis (as we have argued, the Evidence Act analysis should have come first). 
However, had her Honour done so, it is likely the affidavit would have been admitted, on the basis 
that the circumstances provided reasonable assurance of reliability (as a formal affidavit had been 
sworn and witnessed) and that the witness was unavailable (he refused to take part in proceedings, 
was residing abroad and was not able to be summoned) or, in the alternative, that attempting to 
call the witness would cause undue expense and delay (given he was residing abroad, uncompliant, 
and given there were no natural justice concerns about the other party’s inability to cross-examine 
him in the circumstances). 
 
In the remaining hearsay case, L v R,57 we submit that the Judge erred in not relying on the 
Evidence Act 2006 to exclude hearsay evidence, and that exercise of the s 12A(4) discretion was 
inappropriate in the circumstances. That case concerned an appeal from a final protection order 
against L that was granted, in part, on an affidavit containing hearsay statements made by Ms P, a 
former partner of L. The statements were made in a Facebook private message conversation 
between Ms P and Ms R, asserting that L had treated Ms P in a manner similar to the claims by R. 
In his reply, L said of the paragraphs detailing the conversation with Ms P: “I do not intend to 
respond to this. No evidence has been put in by [Ms P].” The Judge inferred that L did not deny 
Ms P’s claim because he knew them to be correct.58 That well might have been so, but we submit 
that best practice, and the approach mandated by s 12A(4)’s prioritisation of the Evidence Act 
2006, would have been to exclude the evidence due to the obvious reliability concerns involved. 
As discussed above, although s 12A(4) allows the Act’s hearsay exclusionary rule to be bypassed, 
the constraints of the section require that this be done in a principled way, with reference to the 
questions of reliability and necessity that hearsay admission raises, and only after engaging with s 
18. It is unlikely that the Facebook messages would have passed a s 18 analysis, and with good 
reason, given the obvious reliability concerns around social media, and given that no reasons were 
put forward as to why Ms P could not give evidence directly. “Best evidence” principles would 
demand calling Ms P to give evidence directly as to the alleged offending, or to admit the hearsay 
only after considering the reliability of her statements and the necessity of admission. Section 18 
is broad enough to allow hearsay to be admitted for compelling reasons, but only provided there 
is reasonable assurance of reliability. 
 
L v R also shows that, although the Evidence Act applies in the Family Court, counsel cannot 
assume that non-compliant evidence will be excluded by the Judge in the absence of an express 




Three of the reviewed cases admitted opinion evidence under s 12A(4). However, in all three cases, 
it is not obvious why the Court could not simply have admitted the evidence using the flexible 
 
57 L v R [2017] NZHC 590, [2017] NZFLR 177. 
58 NS, acting for L in the above matter, had previously represented Ms P. In a separate disciplinary proceeding against 
NS, the Standards Committee found that this conflict prevented NS from pursuing arguments on behalf of L when the 
Facebook material was offered, and that the Facebook material should have been tested. He was fined $2,000 and 
ordered to pay costs of $1,000. On appeal, NS argued the Facebook material was so lacking in weight and worth as to 
not require any response. The appeal Committee did not accept this argument: LCRO 151/2016: Applications for 
review pursuant to section 193 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 NS v TD, TD v NS. 
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opinion rules in the Evidence Act.59 Although s 23 of the Evidence Act provides that statements 
of opinion are not admissible, exceptions are set out in s 24 for opinions that are necessary to 
enable a witness to communicate, or the fact-finder to understand, what the witness saw, heard, or 
otherwise perceived; and in s 25 for expert opinion evidence that is likely to be of substantial help 
to the fact-finder in understanding other evidence or ascertaining any fact of consequence to the 
proceeding. 
 
We note there is a difference of opinion in the case law as to whether the “substantial helpfulness” 
test in s 25 of the Evidence Act 2006 is materially different from the “may assist” test in s 12A(4) 
of the Family Court Act—lower courts have found the latter is lower than the former,60 but the 
Court of Appeal in 2019 opined that evidence that does not meet the substantial helpfulness 
threshold is unlikely to meet the “may assist” threshold in s 12A(4).61 The Court of Appeal’s 
position lends weight to our reading of the s 12A(4) proviso as constrained by the same policies 




We reviewed two cases in which the s 12A(4) discretion was used to abrogate privilege.62 Both 
cases involved, inter alia, privileged settlement communications,63 disclosure of which was sought 
in the context of relationship property disputes. The Evidence Act at the time did not allow for the 
court to disallow privilege based on the need for full disclosure in a division of relationship 
property dispute. However, s 57(3)(d) has since been added to the Evidence Act 2006, which 
excludes settlement communications from privilege if the court considers that, in the interests of 
justice, the need for disclosure in a later proceeding outweighs the need for privilege. This obviates 
the need to rely on the s 12A(4) discretion in such circumstances.  
 
One of the privilege cases, Arrington v Slater, additionally concerned legal professional privilege 
under s 54.64 The applicant sought disclosure of legal documents relating to the respondent’s 
employment settlement payment and a trust he had set up which had purchased a house some 
months after separation. Judge Twaddle found the documents in question satisfied the s 12A(4) 
test of “may assist the Court” so that the protection afforded by s 54 (legal professional privilege) 
could be displaced. However, we submit that reliance on s 12A(4) was unnecessary. The 
respondent’s self-serving decision not to waive his privilege in legal documents relating to (alleged) 
relationship property could have been dealt with by drawing an adverse inference from that 
decision, resulting in a reverse onus on the respondent to prove (by disclosure or otherwise) that 
the property was not relationship property.65 This approach would have avoided the need to rely 
on s 12A(4) or to subvert the strict conventions about the sanctity of legal professional privilege. 
 
 
59 M v Ministry of Social Development [2014] NZHC 3398; Gibbs v Watt [2015] NZFC 5715; Bethell v Bethell [2018] 
NZHC 3171. 
60 M v Ministry of Social Development [2014] NZHC 3398 at [41]; Gibbs v Watt [2015] NZFC 5715 at [30]. 
61 LRR v COL [2019] NZCA 620 at [14]. 
62 Goodwin v Rensford [2015] NZFC 2156; Arrington v Slater [2016] NZFC 5176. 
63 Evidence Act 2006, s 57. 
64 Arrington v Slater [2016] NZFC 5176. 
65 See Clayton v Clayton [2015] NZCA 30, where the Court of Appeal held it was entitled to draw adverse inferences 
from lack of disclosure. 
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Other uses of s 12A(4) 
 
In Gebrien v Todd [2015] NZFC 4949, a case concerning applications for parenting and protection 
orders, the Court noted that the law of evidence applies in the Family Court, but that the Court has 
discretionary powers under s 12A(4) of the Family Court Act 1980. However, the Court also 
correctly noted that ss 7 and 8 of the Evidence Act should remain the “guiding principle” in 
exercising that discretion. 66  During the oral hearing there were numerous instances where 
challenges could have been made under s 8 but were not, so as to allow for the flow of evidence. 
However, the Court specifically omitted some details of events from its judgment because, “had 
the s 8 rule been applied, such matters might well have been excluded”.67 This case is a good 
example of a non-technical, but still principled, approach to admissibility in the often-fraught 
context of family proceedings. 
 
In OG v JK [2016] NZFC 9831, [2017] NZFLR 43 the Court exercised its s 12A(4) discretion to 
accept as evidence an affidavit in improper form (there was no evidence that an oath was taken, or 
that the witness was authorised). Although r 162 of the Family Court Rules 2002 allows the court 
to accept an affidavit despite an irregularity in form, r 168 provides that an affidavit must not be 
read or used in proceedings in a court unless sworn before an authorised person. Without 
discussing these rules, the Court admitted the affidavit in reliance on s 12A(4).68 With respect, it 
is not clear that this is an acceptable use of the s 12A(4) discretion. The “any evidence” discretion 
is set out in s 12A of the Family Court Act 1980 as a qualifier to the applicability of the Evidence 
Act 2006; immediately preceding s 12A is s 12, which specifies that proceedings in the Family 
Court must be brought and dealt with under the Family Court Rules, without an equivalent 
qualification. Legislative reform is needed to clarify whether the s 12A(4) discretion allows for the 
Rules to be bypassed. However, we submit that a better approach than relying on s 12A(4) in this 
instance would have been to treat the affidavit as documentary hearsay, admissible under s 18 of 
the Act pending an enquiry into reliability and necessity.  
 
Summary of case analysis 
 
This review of post-reform case law on s 12A(4) suggests that generally Family Courts are taking 
the admissibility rules and principles in the Evidence Act 2006 seriously, with the Act applying as 
the norm rather than the exception. In cases where the s 12A(4) discretion was exercised, our 
review suggests this was frequently unnecessary, as the Evidence Act 2006 would most likely have 
provided a pathway to admission. In other cases, judges referred to the s 12A(4) as a backstop in 
the event of doubt about admissibility under the Evidence Act 2006. It is possible, and comports 
with one of the author’s practice experience, that judicial overreliance on the discretion is related 
to practitioners being overly dependent on the “any evidence” rule in offering evidence to the 
Family Court. 
 
Specific issues flagged by the case analysis include: 
• Since the privilege cases were decided, s 57(3)(d) of the Evidence Act has provided a 
pathway for disclosure, in the interests of justice, of privileged settlement communications. 
 
66 Gebrien v Todd [2015] NZFC 4949 at [33]. 
67 At [33]. 
68 OG v JK [2016] NZFC 9831, [2017] NZFLR 43 at [13]. 
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This is a sensible exception to the privilege conferred by s 57, and obviates the need to rely 
on the s 12A(4) discretion where settlement communications are at issue in the Family 
Court.  
• The L v R case, dealing with Facebook messages offered as evidence, illustrates a key 
concern with using the s 12A(4) discretion—a lack of engagement with the fundamental 
Evidence Act principle of reliability. It also demonstrates the importance of counsel 
challenging evidence that would be inadmissible under the Act, rather than assuming that 
the Court will take an Act-first approach. 
• There is ongoing uncertainty as to the interplay of the s 12A(4) discretion with the Family 
Court Rules.  
• The special issue of whether children’s hearsay statements can be admitted under the 
Evidence Act 2006, rather than in reliance on s 12A(4) (discussed below).69 
 
V Assessing “Any Evidence” in the Family Court 
 
The “any evidence” discretion is widely regarded as an important feature of family law. However, 
both case analysis and practitioners’ experience suggest there are problems with how the discretion 
is relied on in practice. The costs of the current approach must be weighed against the purported 
benefits of a flexible, non-technical approach to admissibility in the family law context. 
 
A The Costs of “Any Evidence” 
 
As noted above, the “any evidence” rule had been identified as problematic, either in form or in 
application, in the consultation paper preceding the Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill.70 
Problems with both application and form have continued post-reform.  
 
As we have argued above, s 12A(4) clarifies that the Evidence Act 2006 governs admissibility in 
the Family Court, and can only be bypassed in a principled way, in the interests of justice. However, 
in practice, whether due to complacency, confusion, or other factors, inadmissible evidence 
continues to be offered in the Family Court without due regard for the Act and its underlying 
policies. Misguided reliance on the latter half of s 12A(4) can result in the inclusion of unfocussed 
and irrelevant evidence, evidence of dubious credibility, and evidence that is prejudicial, with little 
or cursory engagement with the Evidence Act as mandated by the first half of the section.71 
Counsel face a common dilemma on receiving affidavits containing inadmissible material: to 
ignore evidence considered inadmissible; to challenge admissibility pre-hearing; or to “meet fire 
with fire”.72 The former approach presupposes that arguments as to admissibility will be upheld at 
hearing, which is not guaranteed. The interlocutory application approach may be cost- and time-
prohibitive in the resource-limited Family Court, and introduce significant delays.73 And the latter 
 
69 See below at VB3. 
70 Ministry of Justice Reviewing the Family Court: A Public Consultation Paper (20 September 2011), above n 28. 
71 See, for example, Marsden v Bernard [2016] NZFC 4730 at [14] per Judge Coyle – in a case involving “rank hearsay” 
included in the application, counsel failed to offer any justification for including evidence that would be inadmissible 
under s 17 of the Evidence Act 2006. 
72 Donovan v Graham (1991) 4 PRNZ 311 (HC) at 313 per McGechan J (writing pre-reform). See also Lowe v 
Auckland Family Court [2017] NZHC 758 at [26], noting that where a Court admits too much evidence which does 
not meet acceptable standards of relevance and objectivity, “the other party will feel obliged to address it”. 
73 On the decision to make an interlocutory application regarding evidence, see below at n 115. 
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approach results in affidavits becoming long and discursive, as parties respond to allegations which 
might be without any evidential foundation or which are completely tangential to the proceeding. 
Improper evidence can cause affidavits to “mushroom, with irrelevance piled upon irrelevance, 
accusation upon accusation, and with the parties becoming increasingly and unproductively 
inflamed”.74 Proceedings risk becoming protracted and side-tracked by irrelevant or unreliable 
information which inadvertently becomes a central focus, breeding further conflict, increasing 
costs, and obfuscating key issues.75  
 
Arguably these problems, which are admittedly difficult to quantify, are more an issue of practice 
rather than law. Our case analysis, above, suggests that judges are taking the Evidence Act 2006 
rules seriously, with due prioritisation of the Act over the s 12A(4) discretion. But the form of 
s 12A(4)—with its declaration that the Evidence Act applies, and that the court may receive 
evidence regardless of admissibility under the Evidence Act—may be a contributing factor to poor 
practices. The implications of these two contradictory rules coexisting may not be immediately 
obvious to practitioners, let alone self-represented litigants, without knowledge of the case law and 
commentary on s 12A(4). The threshold “may assist” test for exercising the “any evidence” 
discretion is also unclear and open to debate (we have set out our position on the proper 
interpretation above). 
 
B Arguments for “Any Evidence” 
 
1 Reduced technicality, promotion of efficiency and conciliation 
 
The Family Court was created with the intention of departing from a strictly adversarial model, 
following a suggestion in the Beattie Report. 76  The less-adversarial approach is achieved by 
reducing formality and unnecessary technicality,77 and requiring lawyers (as far as possible) to act 
in a way that promotes conciliation. 78  There is less emphasis on onus and burden of proof, 
particularly in relation to children, although each party still bears the burden of proving particular 
elements of their claim. 
 
In this context, a more relaxed approach to evidence is arguably an important aspect of disposing 
of proceedings more efficiently. This rationale is particularly salient with respect to proceedings 
involving unrepresented litigants, who may struggle to comply with, or engage in arguments about 
the application of, strict admissibility rules. Related to this, relaxation of the rules of evidence 
 
74 Donovan v Graham, above n 72, at 313. 
75 KRM v BRM [2012] NZFC 5325 at [20] per Judge Adams, noting that, while sometimes it is wise to leave the 
“pruning” of affidavits until hearing, on the other hand:  
… where evidence is advanced that clearly infringes the proper ambit of evidence, it should be 
removed so that it does not provide a distraction or an irritation for the parties. Moreover, if 
evidence that is truly objectionable remains on the file, it is likely to prolong the hearing and to 
render the forum toxic.  
 
76 David Beattie Royal Commission on the Courts (New Zealand Government, Wellington, 1978). 
77 Family Court Act 1980, s 10. 
78 Section 9A. 
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arguably reduces opportunities for conflict amongst litigants, in that arguments about admissibility 
can be bypassed.  
 
However, the logic of dispensing with formal requirements for evidential rules as a way of 
reducing technicality and conflict and expediting proceedings has its limits. The reduction of 
technicality and opportunities for conflict about admissibility cannot justify the admission of poor-
quality evidence. Generally, including poor-quality evidence may add to errors in fact-finding and 
inflate Court hearing time. Moreover, the admission of evidence that is irrelevant or unduly 
prejudicial is likely to breed conflict by giving rise to a natural desire for “tit for tat”. As such, both 
s 12A(4) (implicitly) and the Courts (expressly) recognise that “avoidance of unnecessary 
formality is not the same as a lax approach to basic legal principle”.79 Properly applied, the “any 
evidence” rule requires engagement with at least the basic principles of evidence law—relevance, 
probative value and prejudicial effect—that fetter the discretion, and justification for departure 
from specific rules, which must take into account the underlying purpose of those rules (including 
fairness to parties and witnesses). As Judge Inglis QC has reasoned:80  
[“Any evidence” rules] have been enacted to provide the Court with a discretion to 
ensure that justice is done, not with a discretion to degrade justice by cutting corners 
however convenient and time-saving that may be. 
 
2 Assure best interests by preventing omissions 
 
Another argument for “any evidence” in the Family Court is that application of the Evidence Act 
would in some instances result in the exclusion of important relevant information. Safeguarding 
against inadvertent omissions is of particular concern when the Family Court exercises its 
protective parens patriae jurisdiction. If a strict adherence to rules means that important 
information is absent from the body of information available to the Family Court in determining 
what is in the best interests of the child, this would arguably be a failure by the state to protect the 
child and a breach of its duty as parens patriae.81 Indeed, in its final departmental report on the 
proposed Family Court reforms, the Ministry of Justice concluded that the “any evidence” rule 
should be retained to ensure “that the Court has any evidence relevant to a child’s welfare and best 
interests needed to make a decision”.82 
 
The parens patriae doctrine can be used to justify the application of the “any evidence” rule not 
only to cases impacting children, but also to the protection of other vulnerable persons. Many 
 
79 Per Judge Inglis QC, cited by MacKenzie J in S v Children, Young Persons and their Families Service (2007) 26 
FRNZ 562 (HC) at [17]. See also Liddle v Liddle [2003] NZFLR 632 at [7]. 
80 Re S the Children FC NWP CYPF043/013/99, 24 April 2002 per Judge Inglis QC at [53]. 
81 Related is the paramountcy principle, which gradually emerged from the doctrine of parens patriae. When the Court 
(standing in for the state) acts protectively, it prioritises the welfare and best interests of the child as the most 
vulnerable citizen requiring protection. See Care of Children Act 2004, s 4: “The welfare and best interests of a child 
in his or her particular circumstances must be the first and paramount consideration— 
(a)  in the administration and application of this Act, for example, in proceedings under this Act; and 
(b)  in any other proceedings involving the guardianship of, or the role of providing day-to-day care for, or contact 
with, a child.” 
82 Ministry of Justice Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill: Departmental Report (April 2013) at 79. The report also 
notes that the Ministry of Justice received four submissions regarding the proposed s 12A insertion, with one 
submission against the continued use of the “any evidence” rule in the Family Court. 
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Family Court proceedings deal with vulnerable persons such as children, victims of domestic 
violence, and persons with limited or no mental capacity. This unifying characteristic points to 
parens patriae as a convincing theoretical foundation for the application of an “any evidence” rule 
across the different Acts administered by the Court, but only to cases involving vulnerable persons. 
 
As discussed above, a correct reading of the fettered “any evidence” discretion is that counsel 
ought not offer, and Judges ought not admit, evidence that would fail a s 7 or s 8 analysis. Far from 
being of assistance to the Court in determining “best interests”, admission of evidence that is 
irrelevant,83 or insufficiently probative as weighed against prejudicial effect or delay, 84 could 
inadvertently operate against the interests of children.  
 
Our case analysis did not yield any instances of courts ignoring ss 7 or 8 in reliance on the s 12A(4) 
discretion—although that is not to say this does not happen in practice. The “prevention of 
omissions” argument also assumes that, where evidence passes the general “gateway” tests in ss 7 
or 8, the Evidence Act will on occasion be too strict to admit all evidence relevant to a child’s 
welfare and best interests. Our case analysis supported this contention in one respect only—in 
relation to the admission of children’s hearsay statements. Other than in relation to children’s 
hearsay, we found no other examples of important child-related evidence being excluded by the 
Evidence Act 2006, necessitating admission via s 12A(4). 
 
3 The special issue of children’s hearsay 
 
In De Boock v Hoover,85 an application for a final protection order, the Court declined to admit 
hearsay statements made by a child86 to the mother and to the lawyer for the child about violence 
in the family home. The child’s statements would have corroborated the mother’s evidence that 
the father was physically violent, which the father denied.  
 
Judge Courtney identified the statements of the child as hearsay statements and examined them in 
terms of s 18 of the Evidence Act 2006, noting that children are “not usually called to give evidence 
in Family Court proceedings but on a strict interpretation of section 18 of the Evidence Act [the 
child] is available and it would not be impractical to have her called”.87 The Judge noted but 
declined to exercise the s 12A(4) discretion, finding the child’s statements would not be of 




83 Evidence Act 2006, s 7. 
84 Section 8. 
85 De Boock v Hoover [2015] NZFC 5848. 
86 The child was not the “subject of the proceedings” which means either that she was a child of the mother only or a 
child over the age of 16 so that the court proceedings did not apply to her. The comments of the Judge indicate that 
the child was of an age or capacity where she was “available”.  
87 De Boock v Hoover [2015] NZFC 5848 at [60]. See O v S, above n 38, at [11] per Judge Moss, finding a child was 
unavailable for the purposes of s 18 because “established practice in the Family Court [is] that young children do not 
give evidence in relation to the central questions in litigation relating to their parenting”. 
88 We make no comment here on this argument, except to point out that corroboration is typically very difficult to 
come by in domestic violence cases, and it is not obvious from the decision why the corroborative evidence of the 
child failed the “may assist” test in s 12A(4). 
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Although we cannot speak to the facts of this particular case, we argue that cases involving hearsay 
statements of children generally present a strong argument for exercising the s 12A(4) discretion. 
Children who are of an age and capacity to give evidence are compellable according to the broad 
provisions of s 71 of the Evidence Act, and therefore available as witnesses according to the 
hearsay rules (assuming none of the other unavailability heads apply). However, there are strong 
policy reasons why children should not be compelled to give evidence in Family Court proceedings, 
regardless of their age. It is well understood that the experience of being a witness is stressful for 
children,89 and calling a child to bear witness against a family member may well cause irreparable 
harm to family relationships. As such, it will generally not be in a child’s best interests to call her 
to be cross-examined. Indeed, as a matter of practice, it is rare for children to be called to give 
evidence in the Family Court.90  
 
While it is good practice not to call children as witnesses, it is still important that their views and 
evidence are before the court, assuming they are being reliably reported. However, a strict 
application of the Evidence Act 2006 hearsay rules would preclude the admission of a child’s 
hearsay statement where the child is available to be a witness. Here is where the Evidence Act is 
too strict to serve the best interests of children in Family Court proceedings. In the absence of a 
rule providing that children are not compellable in Family Court proceedings,91 there is no way to 
allow reliable child hearsay statements to be admitted as evidence other than by the “any evidence” 
rule. The “any evidence” rule is useful, then, for allowing the admission of hearsay statements 
made by children of all ages, allowing their views and evidence to be heard without putting them 
through the trauma of being a witness. 
 
We are of the view that creating an express rule that children are not compellable in Family Court 
proceedings would be the best approach to admitting child hearsay evidence, rather than reliance 
on an “any evidence” rule. This would allow for admission of child hearsay statements under s 18 
of the Evidence Act 2006, which requires engagement with the question of whether the 
circumstances of the statement provide reasonable assurance of reliability. Of course, where 
appropriate and safe for a child to give evidence directly, this would still be possible.92  
 
 
89 John Spencer and Rhona Flin The Evidence of Children: The Law and Psychology (Blackstone Press, Great Britain, 
1990) at ch 13. 
90 The Family Court has several ways to hear and admit evidence of children’s out-of-court statements. The most 
common way is for a lawyer to be appointed for the child, and for that lawyer to present the child’s views in a report. 
Children’s views are also conveyed in psychologist’s reports and in judicial interviews. Where children do give 
evidence, the Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 s 167 and the Evidence Act 2006 s 107B provide for alternative means of 
giving evidence. In cases of suspected abuse, specialist police or departmental interviewers speak with the child and 
this is recorded on video. On application under s 22 of the Evidence Regulations 2007, these evidential videos can be 
viewed by the Family Court in proceedings in certain cases. 
91 We note that a child witness could be deemed unavailable for the purposes of s 18 due to de facto non-compellability 
if their non-attendance is excused by the court, but this is an uncertain solution based on judicial discretion. For a 
discussion about excusing a witness from testifying, see Mahoney and others The Evidence Act 2006: Act & Analysis 
(3rd ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington 2014) at [EV71.05].  
92 We acknowledge that the issue of compellability of children as witnesses is complex. It requires careful balancing 
of competing issues: the need to protect children from exposure to family court processes; the right of children to be 
heard in any proceeding affecting them; the importance of admitting relevant and reliable evidence from children, 
including testing their evidence by cross-examination; and the associated natural justice rights of parents against whom 
an accusation is levelled. Lengthier engagement with this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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We note here that in both England and Wales, and Australia, following longstanding conventions 
of not applying the hearsay rule strictly to children’s evidence, exceptions to the hearsay rule have 
been legislated to apply specifically to hearsay statements offered in child-related proceedings. In 
England and Wales, which does not have a family law “any evidence” rule, there had been 
“almost … a gentlemen’s agreement that in the interests of protecting children the hearsay rule 
would not be applied strictly or at all in many cases”.93 When a series of Court of Appeal cases in 
the late 1980s called this practice into question, the Children Act 1989 (UK) was amended to allow 
the Lord Chancellor to make special rules for the admissibility of hearsay evidence,94 and the 
Children (Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence) Order was subsequently made.95 The Order applies 
to any hearsay evidence “given in connection with the upbringing, maintenance or welfare of a 
child”, in family and child support proceedings, and is not limited to statements made by children.96  
 
In Australia, an “any evidence” discretion was enacted in 2006, as part of a “less adversarial trial” 
overhaul to child-related proceedings.97 Section 69ZT of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) provides 
that certain provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), including the hearsay rules, do not apply 
to child-related proceedings. The court has a discretion to choose to apply the Evidence Act to 
child-related proceedings. However, even then section 69ZV would apply, which specifically 
permits the admission of children’s hearsay statements if they are relevant to the welfare of the 
child or another child.  
 




Some commentators argue that the “any evidence” rule is a useful and necessary adjunct to admit 
non-expert opinion evidence of parents about their children, evidence that “may not be admissible 
or accorded much weight under conventional criteria”.98 For example, a mother may depose that 
her child “has separation anxiety” when in her father’s care, or “doesn’t cope well” with a visitation 
schedule. However, those opinions will invariably be based on observations the parent has made 
about what a child has said or done, and it is preferable for evidence of those observations to be 
offered, rather than the conclusions drawn from those observations. Where it is not practicable for 
a parent to avoid offering opinions, the Evidence Act “layperson opinion” rule in s 24 is flexible 
enough to admit relevant and helpful information, in line with the paramountcy principle.   
 
Hearsay in without notice applications 
 
 
93 Jane Fortin “Care Proceedings and the Hearsay Rule” (1989) 2 J Child L 7 at 8. 
94 Children Act 1989 (UK), s 96(3). 
95 Children (Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence) Order 1991, SI 1995/1115, revoked and superseded by the Children 
(Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence) Order 1993, SI 1993/621.  
96 Children (Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence) Order 1991, above n 95, cl 2(1). 
97 Division 12A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), introduced by the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental 
Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth). For an overview of the reforms, see Patrick Fitzgerald and Michelle Fernando “Has 
the Less Adversarial Trial process abolished the Rules of Evidence?” (2009) 20(3) AFL 25.  
98 Jill Moss and Stephen van Bohemen “Domestic Violence Act proceedings—new rigour in evidence and proof” 
(paper presented to New Zealand Law Society Family Law Conference, Dunedin, October 2015) 401 at 405. 
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Since the radical family law amendments of 2014, the majority of Family Court applications are 
commenced without notice. 99  Without notice applications are prepared under considerable 
pressure, and it is frequently necessary to rely on hearsay evidence in such an application due to 
the inability of a statement-maker to depose directly in an urgent situation. For example, an 
applicant for a protection order may have a subjective fear based on what they have been told by 
a third party (“he texted me that when he sees you he’ll kill you”). Likewise, an applicant for a 
parenting order may fear for the immediate safety of their child in the care of the other parent due 
to hearing from a neighbour that the parent has been using methamphetamine.  
 
In an urgent without notice situation, the hearsay rules in the Evidence Act are sufficiently flexible 
to allow for the admission of hearsay, assuming that the circumstances provide reasonable 
assurance of reliability,100 and by having regard to the “undue delay” that would be caused by 
requiring the statement maker to provide evidence first-hand.101 In non-urgent situations, and 
assuming the statement-maker is available to give evidence directly, they should be called to do 
so, in order to provide an opportunity for the evidence to be tested.102 
 
Balanced against the need to provide urgent relief for the safety of children and adults through the 
use of without notice applications is the risk of serious injustices if poor quality evidence is not 
quickly remedied. While the urgent nature of without notice applications may require a flexible 
reading of “undue delay” for the purposes of s 18, there are currently no rules requiring pleadings 
to be later remedied if challenged (for example, by filing an affidavit from a witness whose 
evidence was first offered as a hearsay statement). 103 Such a rule would provide a relatively simple 
solution to this pervasive problem. 
 
Corroboration of family violence 
 
The Family Court will often deal with situations where evidence is inherently hard to come by, 
due to the private nature of the disputes. For example, in the context of family violence proceedings, 
which almost always occur in the privacy of the home and rarely in front of others, “prior consistent 
statement” evidence—that the victim complained of the abuse to others—may be the only 
corroboration in a “he said, she said” dispute. We note here that application of the Evidence Act 
2006 would allow for admission of such evidence under the rule in s 35(2)(a) (offering a previous 
 
99 Nan Wehipeihana, Kellie Spee and Shaun Akroyd “Without notice applications in the Family Court: A research 
report prepared for the Ministry of Justice” (Ministry of Justice, July 2017) at [27], available at 
<https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/Without-notice-applications-in-the-Family-Court-
Final-Report.pdf>. 
100 Section 18(1)(a). 
101 Section 18(1)(b)(ii). 
102 A concern here is that family harm may be compounded where victims of family violence are required to testify to 
foundational facts – for example, in applying for a final protection order. It should be noted that the Evidence Act 
addresses that concern through various mechanisms. See, for example, s 95 (prohibiting cross-examination of 
domestic violence victims by perpetrators) and ss 103-106 (alternative ways of giving evidence).  
103 Such a rule—imposing an obligation/time limit on the filing of direct evidence after hearsay evidence is used in 
support of an application—was considered, but ultimately rejected, by the Ministry of Justice in its 2011 reform-
scoping consultation: Ministry of Justice Reviewing the Family Court: A public consultation paper (20 September 
2011) at 48. 
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consistent statement to respond to a challenge to the witness’s veracity or accuracy), without resort 




The privilege cases canvassed above105 demonstrate that the Evidence Act 2006 privilege schema 
is flexible enough to allow for the necessary disclosure of privileged settlement documents in 
family law proceedings, by virtue of the newly-enacted s 57(3)(d).  
 
Non-compliance with Family Court Rules 
 
As discussed above, in our view it is unclear whether the “any evidence” discretion can be used to 
circumvent Family Court Rules. If this is one of the intended purposes of the discretion, then 
greater statutory clarity would be appropriate. As the focus of this article is on the rules of the 
Evidence Act rather than the Family Court Rules, we do not take a position on this point, except 
to point out that it was unnecessary to exercise the discretion to bypass the relevant Family Court 
Rules in OG v JK, as the affidavit in question could have been treated as hearsay.106 As such, the 
case does not provide strong support for retention of the s 12A(4) discretion.  
 
VI Arguments for Reformed Law and Practice 
 
The reformed s 12A(4) “any evidence” rule is an improvement on previous iterations of the rule, 
in that it is prefaced by reference to the applicability of the Evidence Act 2006 to proceedings in 
the Family Court. This goes some way towards establishing that application of the Evidence Act 
2006 should be the norm, rather than the exception, in the Family Court. We have argued that 
where the discretion is exercised, it is properly read as fettered by the rules in ss 7 and 8 of the 
Evidence Act, and any departure from the remaining exclusionary rules in the Act must be on a 
principled basis, in line with the interests of natural justice. Indeed, even prior to reform, the “any 
evidence” discretion had long been interpreted as mandating analysis, not anarchy, when it came 
to evidence law principles.107 
 
However, in its current form, s 12A(4) is not sufficiently clear on these points, resulting in the 
potential for confusion and complacency when it comes to evidence rules in the Family Court. The 
Evidence Act fetters on the discretion are not self-evident from the wording of s 12A(4), which 
risks practitioners and judges alike taking an inappropriately lax approach to the quality of 
evidence.108 The increasing number of self-litigants in the Family Court contributes to this culture 
of free evidence. 
 
 
104 See Naidoo v Narayanan [2018] NZHC 2219, where the applicant applied for leave to adduce domestic violence 
records obtained from the New Zealand Police. The Court accepted that the records were no more than a self-reported 
account of events made by the applicant and were “prior consistent statements” (s 35(1) of the Evidence Act). However, 
the Court held that s 35(2) of the Act permitted admission, as a challenge to the applicant’s veracity was anticipated. 
105 At 62. 
106 OG v JK, above n 68. 
107 Above at IIB. 
108 Jefferson above n 26, at 43, noting that the “any evidence” rule “has not displaced the duty of lawyers to abide the 
“best evidence” rule. 
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Some might argue that these problems are mitigated in the Family Court because judges are able 
to sort out the wheat from the chaff, and so, for expediency and to ensure nothing important is 
inadvertently excluded, a “free proof” approach is preferable. But leaving it to judges to sift chaff, 
and to disregard evidence that is, say, unduly prejudicial or unreliable, puts great faith in judicial 
discretion, where there is always a risk of unconscious bias operating,109 or of the fetters on the 
“any evidence” rule being inadvertently disregarded. It also invites disparate treatment between 
cases. At the heart of the objection is the risk of unfairness of both process and outcome, and 
perceptions of unfairness, compromising the integrity of the whole court process.  
 
Accordingly, and in light of issues in evidentiary practices in the Family Court, our analysis 
suggests that greater clarity is needed. First, although s 12A(4) expressly provides for the 
application of the Evidence Act 2006, the interplay of this provision with the subsequent “any 
evidence” discretion is not clear at face value. Further, we have argued that the added gloss on the 
discretion—that it can only be exercised to admit evidence that may assist the court—mandates 
engagement with basic evidentiary principles. However, this is open to debate, and legislative 
clarity would be preferable.110  
 
A Repeal the rule 
 
Our analysis suggests that the rule is not necessary other than in relation to children’s hearsay 
statements. Given the confusion the rule causes, and potential for it to be relied on incorrectly— 
without due regard for fundamental principles that properly fetter the discretion—the most 
straightforward and logical solution would be to revoke, rather than reformulate, the rule, while 
enacting special provisions allowing for the admission of children’s hearsay statements. Given that 
the Evidence Act expressly applies to Family Court proceedings, this could be effected by 
repealing s 12A(4), and revoking the rule where it has been left in individual statutes.111 
 
B Reform the rule 
 
A less radical approach would be to amend the formulation of the discretion in s 12A(4), to clarify 
that the Evidence Act 2006 applies to Family Court proceedings, unless the interests of justice 
require otherwise. This would force express engagement with the underlying principles and 
policies embodied in the Evidence Act rules, by putting the onus on the party offering inadmissible 
evidence to persuade the judge that bypassing the Act is in the interests of justice. At a minimum, 
ss 7 and 8 of the Evidence Act should be specified as always binding, as it can never be in the 
interests of justice to admit evidence that is inadmissible under those fundamental sections. Again, 
this would force engagement with questions of relevance, reliability and prejudicial effect, rather 
than complacent reliance on the “any evidence” discretion. 
 
 
109 Canadian evidence law professor DA Rollie Thompson notes that there is an argument that judges may in fact be 
more susceptible to prejudicial evidence than juries: DA Rollie Thompson “Are there any Rules of Evidence in Family 
Law?” 21 Canadian Family Law Quarterly 245 (2003) at fn 12.   
110 See M v Ministry of Social Development [2014] NZHC 3398 at [51], finding that the “may assist” threshold is low, 
and probably “not much higher than mere relevance”—the test set out in s 7 of the Evidence Act. 
111 Above n 32. 
 23 
Another alternative would be to follow the Australian approach, retaining a limited “any evidence” 
rule that applies only to child-related proceedings and that is expressly limited to certain provisions 
of the Evidence Act.112 It is difficult to see, for example, why it would ever be warranted to ignore 
the rules against admitting improperly obtained evidence, even in child-related family proceedings. 
The downside of retaining the rule, albeit limited to child-related cases, is that a free-for-all 
approach to admissibility of evidence might continue in such proceedings. If the rule is confined 
to child-related proceedings, it would be best to limit its applicability to cases where admission is 
in the best interests and welfare of a child. This is similar to a “natural justice” test, but with an 
emphasis on the paramountcy principle—that the court must prioritise the best interests of the 
child.113 However, lawyers and judges will still need a major shift in mindset to avoid the routine 
admission of inadmissible evidence, given the potentially very broad scope of a “best interests and 
welfare” test. Such a radical shift in family law practice is unlikely to happen, we submit, without 
outright repeal of s 12A(4).  
 
C Special Issue: Children’s Hearsay  
 
Whether revoked or reformulated, a supplementary special approach to children’s hearsay is 
necessary. As noted, the s 12A(4) discretion is most useful as a means of admitting children’s 
hearsay statements, which allows children to avoid the ordeal of giving evidence in court. The 
admission of children’s hearsay statements upholds two important children’s rights: to special 
protection, and to be heard in any proceeding affecting the child. To accommodate the admission 
of children’s hearsay statements, the definition of “unavailable” in s 16(2) of the Evidence Act 
could be amended to provide that children are “unavailable as a witness” in any Family Court 
proceeding affecting the child. The admission of a child’s hearsay statement would rightly still 
require satisfying the s 18(1)(a) reliability test, and if admitted, would be balanced against all other 
evidence available and the circumstances of the child and their statement.114 For criminal matters, 
a child would still be available and eligible as a witness when required given the gravity attaching 
to criminal proceedings. 
 
D Evidential Rigour in Practice 
 
In the meantime, it is vital that practitioners and judges alike take careful notice of the reformed, 
limited formulation of “any evidence” in the Family Court, and engage openly with the question 
of whether evidence is of assistance to the court, by reference to the fundamental principles of 
relevance, reliability, probative value and prejudicial effect. The Evidence Act 2006 should be the 
first resort, only to be bypassed on the basis of convincing, principled argument. Judges should be 
openly challenged to engage with specific provisions in the Evidence Act, as well as its underlying 
principles and policy concerns.115  
 
112 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 69ZT (certain provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)—notably parts dealing 
with hearsay, opinion, admissions, evidence of convictions, credibility and character—do not apply to child-related 
proceedings). 
113 Above n 81.  
114 See Butler-Sloss LJ’s comments on the weighing up exercise in Re W (Minors) (Wardship: Evidence) [1990] 1 
FLR 203 (CA). 
115 In making this point, we acknowledge that recourse to interlocutory admissibility challenges in Family Court 
proceedings must be had judiciously. Pre-hearing admissibility rulings would increase costs and delays, but leaving 
problematic evidence on file until hearing can also increase costs and delays in that parties may feel obliged to respond. 
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At this point in the discussion, the obvious question is whether a more rigorous approach to 
admissibility, such as we are advocating for, is practical in the Family Court, given the high 
number of self-represented litigants. Indeed, we conclude above that one of the strongest 
arguments for “any evidence” is the avoidance of technicality. However, we also note that the 
argument has its limits, in that even in its current form, properly applied the “any evidence” rule 
requires engagement with the Evidence Act. If such engagement is beyond the abilities of the 
average self-represented litigant, then this speaks to a broader issue—how to assist self-represented 
litigants in complying with procedural rules, including compliance with important evidentiary 
rules, without undermining the basic natural justice principles that those rules purport to serve. 
The approach of the Court in Gebrien v Todd, discussed above,116 illustrates the striking of a good 
balance between these concerns—the Court maintained a focus on s 8 as the “guiding principle” 
for the admission of evidence, but also did not take an overly rigid or technical approach to the 




On its face, the “any evidence” rule dispenses with formality and technicality, which may assist 
with the efficiency of Family Court proceedings. However, “avoidance of unnecessary formality 
is not the same as a lax approach to basic legal principle”. 117 Our analysis suggests that the 
approach to evidence in the Family Court needs to be reworked. Judges continue to rely on the 
discretion unnecessarily, and counsel continue to offer evidence without engaging with basic 
Evidence Act principles. The principles which underpin the Evidence Act—relevance, reliability, 
probative value, prejudicial effect and efficiency—are fundamental to resolving disputes in a fair 
and just way, and s 12A(4) should not be relied on to sidestep engagement with these issues.  
 
There is arguably no other area of law which can so intimately impact ordinary citizens as family 
law. The view of some lawyers and politicians that the Family Court is an ill-disciplined quasi-
legal forum is unjustified, but the current approach to evidence does not help the court’s reputation. 
The promise of New Zealand’s Evidence Act is that facts will be established by logical rules, rights 
affirmed by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 will be recognised, fairness to parties and 
witnesses will be promoted, rights of confidentiality and other important public interests will be 
protected, unjustifiable expense and delay will be avoided, and access to the law of evidence 
enhanced across all courts.120 These aspirational promises and gains are eroded and devalued by 
the permissive and unchecked discretion left in place for family proceedings under the “any 
evidence” rule.    
 
 
116 Above n 66. 
117 S v Children, Young Persons and their Families Service, above n 80, at [17]. 
120 Evidence Act 2006, s 6. 
